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Abstract
In this paper, we study the effect of the release of emission information on housing prices. The main
event under study is the release of the first wave of data from the European Pollutant Release and Transfer
Register (E-PRTR) publishing emission quantities for the reporting year 2007. We base our analysis on
quarterly house prices at the German postal code level for the years 2004-2011 and provide, to the best
of our knowledge, the first analysis outside the US on this research question. We estimate a differences-
in-differences model and find no significant effect of the release of emission information on the value of
houses in affected postal code areas when controlling for observable differences in land use, prevalence
of housing types, tax revenues and other postal code area characteristics by means of propensity score
matching. This result survives several robustness checks. We conclude that disclosing the first wave of
E-PRTR emissions had no robust impact on housing prices.
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1 Introduction
According to the concept of “regulation by information”, the mere provision of information can generate
community pressure on polluters to reduce their emissions as households respond to the information. While
there is evidence that households adjust their behavior to reduce the negative consequences for their health
when provided with information on water quality (Graff Zivin et al., 2011) or ambient ozone (Neidell, 2009,
Moretti and Neidell, 2011), empirical studies on the most prominent program established on this concept,
the US-American Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), have yielded mixed results. Sanders (2013) is most similar
to our analysis. Sanders analyzes the effect of an enlargement in the TRI database using a large set of postal
codes from multiple states and finds a significant and negative impact on affected postal codes. We look
at the revelation of emissions information in Germany and in doing so provide what seems to be the first
attempt in Europe to assess the impact of large scale publications of pollution information on house prices.
Our definition of treatment differs from Sanders’ approach and we are fortunate to have a more detailed data
set describing the characteristics of postal code areas to address the issue of finding comparable treatment and
control groups in our sample. Our results show the importance of controlling for such observable differences.
Despite the weak evidence base supporting the effectiveness of the TRI, several other countries have
launched similar registers, also in Europe. The main event under study is the first wave of data from the
European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR), released in 2009 and reporting on pollutant
emissions from 2007. The E-PRTR replaced its predecessor, the European Pollutant Emission Register
(EPER), and included an expanded set of both emissions and facilities. Following its initial data release
the E-PRTR received a considerably larger amount of media attention than its predecessor. The pollutants
covered in the new register are emitted to one of three media: air, water or soil with approximately 60
pollutants in each group and with some degree of overlap. E-PRTR emissions data is collected yearly with
a delay of approximately 2 years. So far, comprehensive data releases have taken place in 2009, 2010, 2011
and 2012.
We base our analysis on quarterly house prices at the German postal code level (“Postleitzahlen”) for
the years 2004-2011. Our identification strategy is based on a differences-in-differences model using the
time of the announcement to identify varying developments in housing prices in the treatment and control
group. It relies on several assumptions concerning market extent and the identification of an appropriate
control group. The control group should be identical to the treatment group in the absence of treatment
for the treatment effect to be accurately identified. We collect a large data set on land use characteristics
and combine it with socio-economic information on municipalities which are spatially assigned to individual
postal code areas. These data indicate substantial systematic differences between the treated postal code
areas and the untreated areas in the full data and reveal substantial differences between treated postal code
areas in the former Eastern and Western Germany. Based on our data on the observable characteristics we
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match our treated postal code areas to suitable controls. With matching both the size and significance of
the treatment effects in either region are dramatically reduced and we are unable to find any effect of the
information revelation.
We carry out a number of robustness checks based on our treatment definition. Our main treatment
definition may be too broad as small emissions are treated as equal to large emissions (Sanders (2013)
emphasizes non-linear effects in emission quantities). To better capture the quantity emitted, we redefined
the treatment variable to indicate quartiles of toxicity weighted emissions. We approximate toxicity by the
reporting thresholds for the register. These thresholds are publicly available and send a signal about the
danger associated with the emission. No significant effect was found after matching was used. Additional
robustness checks concern the distance to emissions and narrowing down the treatment definition to concern
only those postal codes with urban area within 500 m of an emission. In sum, our results suggest that
disclosing the first wave of E-PRTR emissions had no significant impact on average housing prices in Germany
at the postal code level once we account for observable characteristics of the postal code areas.
2 Related Literature and Background
2.1 Empirical evidence on environmental amenities in the housing market
Following Tiebout’s seminal paper on households voting with their feet Tiebout (1956), households’ resi-
dential choice should reflect their preferences for public goods including environmental amenities. Housing
markets are often used for non-market valuation purposes including a large literature on housing prices and
environmental amenities using e.g. the hedonic model (Palmquist, 2004). Much of this literature focuses on
the impact of air pollution measures on housing prices or on localized amenities and disamenities such as
power plants (Davis, 2011) and Superfund sites (Mastromonaco, forthcoming).1 In the last decade, a number
of papers on environmental valuation using a quasi-experimental approach have emerged (e.g. Greenstone
and Gallagher (2008) on Superfund sites and Davis (2004) on cancer clusters). As emphasized by Parmeter
and Pope (2009), the use of treatment evaluation techniques aids in overcoming a number of issues concerning
omitted variable bias, which is otherwise an inherent problem in most cross-sectional hedonic analyses. It
should be noted however, that while the hedonic model aims to recover a marginal willingness to pay measure
from the slope of the hedonic price function, the quasi-experimental approach recovers a capitalization effect.
Kuminoff and Pope (2011) emphasize that several assumptions are required to interpret the capitalized effect
as an estimate of households’ average marginal willingness to pay for the amenity.
1Housing markets have also been used to evaluate the change in utility due to proximity to sex offenders (Linden and Rockoff,
2008), school quality, etc.
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There are several studies which look at the effect of providing pollution information on housing prices.
Pope (2008) looks at the introduction of disclosure laws requiring sellers to provide information about airport
noise exposure to buyers. The effects on housing prices in the United States of making emission data from
the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) public has already been evaluated by several empirical studies. While
Bui and Mayer (2003) find no significant effects of TRI releases on the housing market at the county level,
Sanders (2013) finds evidence of a negative impact of reported TRI emissions on housing prices using a
nation-wide postal code based approach and conducting an event-study based on the extension of the TRI
pollutant reporting definitions in 1998. There are also papers based on micro-level data. Oberholzer-Gee and
Mitsunari (2006) find a negative effect of emissions at short distances (< 1 mile) from the emitter. Currie
et al. (2013) look at both health effects from residing near polluting facilities and effects of the opening
and closing of polluting facilities registered in the TRI on housing prices. Using micro data on individual
transactions, they also find a significant effect on house prices, albeit at the very local level within 0.5 miles of
the facility. Thus, several of these existing studies find both statistically and economically significant effects
of exposure to pollution on the housing price. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to look at the
effect of the E-PRTR on house prices.
2.2 The quasi-experiment
The European register for emissions was established following the signing of the Aarhus Convention in 1998 by
EU member states. The convention aims to increase democratic participation and grants the public the right
to information about the environment. In 2000 the European Council decided to establish the European Pol-
lutant Emission Register (EPER) based on Article 15(3) of Council Directive 96/61/EC. The main objective
of the EPER was to fulfill the public’s right to know about the releases of pollutants in their neighborhood.
The EPER was a web-based register, which enabled the public to view data on emissions to water and air of
50 key pollutants from large and medium-sized industrial point sources in the European Union. The register
was hosted by the European Environment Agency. In 2003, the UNECE Pollutant Release and Transfer
Register protocol was signed resulting in the establishment of the European Pollutant Release and Transfer
Register (E-PRTR). The E-PRTR expands the coverage of the EPER to include additional substances and
release media. The first round of data for the E-PRTR covers 2007 and was released in 2009 with the launch
of the E-PRTR website.
While the predecessor, the EPER, lived a relatively quiet life,2 the launch of the E-PRTR in 2009 was
heavily publicized. Several major German newspapers announced the launch of the German E-PRTR website
2The EPER made Europe-wide pollution data for the year 2001 available in 2004 and pollution data for the year 2004
available in 2006. However, this register received very little public attention. A LexisNexis search involving German newspapers
regarding the keyword “EPER” yielded only 7 hits for the time frame before 2009. Mentions of the term were largely concentrated
in special interest journals regarding environmental topics or the waste treatment industry such as Entsorga (2004).
4
and released short articles detailing the purpose and the scope of the register. In the period between 2006
and 2011, 43 articles were retrieved from a LexisNexis search for the keywords “E-PRTR” and “PRTR” in
German newspapers. For the year 2009 alone, there were 34 entries.3 The launch was also accompanied by
an official conference in Berlin and the introduction of a more professional website layout. The website itself
is centered around a convenient database hosted on the servers of the European Environment Agency (EEA)
and was featured in a number of popular magazines. Furthermore, maps with the graphical depiction of core
pollution areas and point sources on the website made the information more accessible to people not familiar
with the subject or not interested in filtering through extensive micro data.
In addition, the number of pollutants was greatly expanded in the E-PRTR register to 91 substances
in comparison to 50 EPER categories, leading to 4,727 reported point source releases in the first E-PRTR
data wave compared to 3,413 reported releases in the last EPER data wave with respect to Germany alone.
Altogether it seems reasonable that the information released on June 3rd 2009 should be considered news to
the German households. While they likely had beliefs about the level of pollution in their area, the release
of E-PRTR pollution data provided them with the opportunity to update their beliefs and adjust behavior
if deemed necessary. Hence, we treat the release of the E-PRTR information in the second quarter of 2009
as the pivotal event in our analysis.
3 Method
Our approach is based on differences in differences as we look at the evolution of house prices over time in
different postal code areas. We restrict the data on housing prices (Y ) to a time interval covering two years
before and after the release of the data as suggested by Sanders (2013). Given our quarterly data, we are left
with 16 observations for each postal code area. We include a shift dummy variable (Post) which is set to 1
for all quarters after the release of the emissions data and a dummy variable for treatment (T ). We estimate
the following model with postal code fixed effects (α4i ) and time by state fixed effects (α
5
ts):
Yits = α
0 + α1sPostitStates + α
2Ti + α
3PostitTi + α
4
i + α
5
tsStates + εits
First, the appropriate definition of treatment status (T ) is crucial to our study and we test a number of
different definitions. In the E-PRTR data, the geographical coordinates of each emitter are provided along
with a postal code. Hence, we define a postal code area as treated if it contains at least one emitter. We
refine these treatment definitions to address the concern that quantity emitted may be important in section
3Examples of comprehensive newspaper articles on the newly available E-PRTR data include Abendblatt (2009) and TAZ
(2009).
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6. When performing a fixed effects regression, the treatment dummies are dropped because of their time
invariance and time by state fixed effects are included to control for state-specific time trends.The coefficient
of interest is α3. Its estimate will yield the average treatment effect of the release of emissions data on housing
prices under four conditions.
Second, the extent of the market is important in determining the appropriate capitalization effect if there
is heterogeneity in preferences in different housing markets. Treating large geographic areas (e.g. the whole
USA) as a single market is not unusual in the quasi-experimental hedonic literature (e.g.Greenstone and
Gallagher (2008), Sanders (2012)). Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2013) find that there is considerable
heterogeneity in the capitalization of clean-ups of hazardous waste across the USA. Their findings suggest that
pooling data across regions may be misleading. Given the German history and the resulting very different
economic conditions in the former Eastern and Western Germany, we estimate our model for each of these
two regions separately.
Third, we need to rule out systematical differences between control and treatment group, in particular
in the general housing market trend. If treatment status is determined at least in parts by the value of
an unobserved variable which is correlated with the general development of housing prices, the estimate of
the treatment effect will be biased (e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p.243). We address this concern by
the use of propensity matching techniques to secure comparable control and treatment groups. For this
purpose we carefully collect data on the characteristics of the postal code areas including land use and socio-
demographic information useful in predicting the probability of finding emitters in a location. The market
definition discussed above can also be seen as narrowing down the relevant control group to compare to the
treated postal code areas to control for (regional) differences in terms of unobservable characteristics.4
Finally, we need to assume no other changes unique to the treatment group take place when the data is
released. A potential threat might be the financial crisis that peaked around the time of the first E-PRTR
publication. This would cause problems if treated postal code areas should be affected differently than the
control areas. It could be that housing prices are less volatile in industrial areas due to less speculation as
compared with urban housing and high quality living areas. We can address this concern by including the
share of industrial areas for a postal code area in our matching procedure.
4This point is made in a recent paper by Abbott and Klaiber (2013) in which they use matching to account for observable
characteristics, but use spatial proximity to define comparable units in terms of unobservable characteristics.
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4 Data
4.1 Housing Data
We use the “F&B Wohn-Preis-Index” on the postal code level with quarterly data for the past 10 years
(2002Q2-2012Q1) which has been purchased from F&B GmbH, Hamburg. This hedonic price index is based
on supply data from up to 20 million German real estate objects in the private sector such as family homes,
condominiums and privately owned terrace houses. An adjustment is made to account for the differences
between listing prices and actual transaction prices. The index uses aggregates computed on the basis of
supply data from selected online and oﬄine sources for housing weighted by typical variables such as number
of rooms, age of building, type of residency and location. With these adjustments the index describes how
the development in the price of an “average home” changes across time and postal code areas. Plausibility
checks are performed for each entry and the aggregation process controls for regional and seasonal variation
in types of homes available. Details can be found on the company website5 and have been summarized in
F+B (2012).
The baseline index used is normalized to 100 in 2004Q2 for each postal code and describes the development
in housing prices within each separate postal code relative to the housing price index at this fixed point in
time. We compared the long term trends with annual data obtained from the German Federal Institute
for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (Bundesinstitut fu¨r Bau-, Stadt- und
Raumforschung, BBSR) and found fairly similar trends confirming the general validity of the obtained house
price data.
4.2 Pollution data
4.2.1 Facility reports
Pollution data has been taken from the website of the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register
(E-PRTR). The database itself is maintained by the European Environment Agency6 and the tables used list
pollution data from point sources on the facility level for all European countries reporting to the E-PRTR in
absolute quantities. The database contains releases into air, water and soil as well as transfers to external
waste treatment facilities. The reports differentiate between 96 pollutants, out of which 70 actually occurred
in Germany in the reports for 2007.
5www.f-und-b.de (F+B Forschung und Beratung fu¨r Wohnen, Immobilien und Umwelt GmbH, Hamburg). (Accessed on
28-10-2013).
6Database accessible via: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/member-states-reporting-art-7-under-the-
european-pollutant-release-and-transfer-register-e-prtr-regulation-6
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In total, there have been 26,832 pollutant point source releases and 4,704 waste transfers reported for
all of Germany and all 6 reporting years together. Out of these, 826 entries had to be dropped because of
apparently faulty data submission, restricted information due to confidentiality claims and issues with double
entries. For the year 2007, there were 4,727 point source releases and 952 waste transfers reported for 1,976
individual facilities. For our analysis we exclude reports on CO2 as this substance does not pose a local threat
to nearby households. Moreover, we exclude reports on transfers as their final destination is usually not close
to the reporting site and transportation to another facility such as a waste treatment site should evoke less
concerns within the local community than the direct release of pollutants into the local environment.
4.2.2 Facility locations
The E-PRTR database also contains Gauss-Kru¨ger coordinates (WGS84) of each facility. We use a geographic
information system (ArcGIS) to display the locations and to attribute it to the corresponding postal code
area. Shape files for ArcGIS have been provided by GfK GeoMarketing and contain the full set of 8,212
German postal code areas and the approximately 12,000 municipalities in Germany as of January 2012.7
The location of emissions by postal code areas is displayed in red in Figure 1. The visual representation
shows that emissions are not spread out evenly across Germany. There are several emissions in well-known
industrial areas such as e.g. the Ruhr valley, as well as in certain areas in the former German Democratic
Republic. There are in total 1,118 postal code areas, which contain a point source according to the data set
published in 2009.
7Interestingly, looking at the coordinates revealed that in more than 200 cases in 2007 alone, the postal code in the E-PRTR
reflected the location of a firm’s main office rather than the location of the actual emission.
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Figure 1: Postal code areas with emissions
4.3 Data on postal code areas
4.3.1 Corine land cover data
The Corine Land Cover project was initiated by the European Commission and is managed by the European
Environmental Agency. The data on land use is initially collected from satellite images and then refined
through the use of aerial photographs and other ancillary sources of information. The maps are aggregated
such that the smallest unit of any type is at least 25 hectares. The location precision of the data is 100 m. As
part of the Corine Land Cover project, the land use in Germany was mapped in 2006. Varying categories of
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land use such as urban area, infrastructure, natural areas etc. are defined resulting in a total of 44 categories,
37 of which exist in Germany. We aggregate these into a total of 7 categories: Urban area, Urban green
space, Natural area, Agriculture, Water body, Industrial area and, finally, Landfills and construction sites.
Based on the land use data, we calculate the respective share of individual postal code areas allocated to
each type of land use. An example can be seen in Figure 2, where the different categories of land use are
demonstrated for the postal code covering the centre of Mannheim, Baden-Wuerttemberg. The dots in the
example represent the locations associated with emission reports in the 2007 E-PRTR. Clearly, most of them
are located within industrial areas.
Figure 2: Land use in Mannheim, Germany
4.3.2 Municipality Data
At the municipality level we have access to the 2009 wave of the INKAR8 database provided by the German
Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development. These data describe
8INdikatoren und KARten zur Raum- und Stadtentwicklung in Deutschland und in Europa - Indicators and maps on spatial
and urban development in Germany and Europe.
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the demographic, economic and social composition of municipalities. Among other things these data contain
information about the unemployment rate, prevalent type of housing, age composition and population size
as well as tax revenues at the municipality level. A list of variables in our data set can be found in Tables 2
and 3.
We used the Corine Land Cover information on urban area coverage in the postal code areas to merge
postal code areas with municipalities. In Germany, municipalities and postal codes do not overlap perfectly.
In some cases, several postal code areas will be contained in one municipality. In other cases, several
municipalities will lie within a single postal code area. In the latter case, we merged postal codes with
municipalities based on the share of the total urban area within a postal code area, such that each postal
code was assigned to the municipality with the largest portion of shared urban area. If there was no urban
area in the postal code area, the municipality with the largest share of land was used. Using this procedure,
a few postal code areas were lost as we were not able to match them with municipalities.9 Our sample in the
estimations using matching was therefore reduced to 8,171 postal code areas.
5 Results
5.1 Full Sample
We estimate the model with postal code fixed effects and state-specific time trends (implemented as quarterly
dummies and post dummies). After the release of the E-PRTR the housing market in Germany was dominated
by a positive trend resulting in an average increase of roughly 3% for the subsequent two-year-period. In the
aggregate, housing prices in the treated postal codes rose just as strongly as non-treated ones (column 1 in
Table 1). We proceed to look at the former Eastern and Western Germany separately (columns 2 and 3 in
Table 1). The results differ a great deal between the two regions. Even with state-specific time trends the
effect is strongly significant across the board, but with opposite signs for Eastern and Western Germany. In
Eastern Germany, a negative effect is found and in Western Germany a positive effect.
9Over the last years there have been several municipal reforms merging and dividing municipalities. Since our INKAR data
is from 2009 we had to match municipalities from then to present municipal structures and then to the postal code areas. Since
no old shape files were available for municipalities, some municipalities were lost in the first step of this process.
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Table 1: Panel estimates, full sample
Full data Full sample Western Germany Eastern Germany
(1) (2) (3)
Post*T 0.053 0.236 ** -0.399 ***
(0.081) (0.091) (0.166)
Constant 95.791 *** 95.893 *** 95.303 ***
(0.0259) (0.029) (0.059)
Postal code FE Yes Yes Yes
State-specific Post Yes Yes Yes
State specific trends Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.394 0.387 0.424
Observations 8212 6799 1413
Treated observations (T=1) 1118 741 377
Note. Dependent variable is house price index; clustered standard errors in parantheses.
*/**/*** Significant at the 5%/1%/0.1% level.
5.2 Matching
The underlying assumption in the differences in differences approach is that the treatment and the control
group have the same observable and unobservable characteristics except for the fact that the treatment group
was exposed to treatment. If the control group differs significantly from the treatment group, any effects
found using the differences in differences estimator may be due to the underlying heterogeneity between
treatment and control group. Given that we have constructed a data set describing the characteristics of the
postal code areas, we can check if this assumption holds for observable variables. If the treatment group and
control group are similar in terms of observable characteristics it seems more likely that they should also be
similar in terms of unobservable characteristics. We compared the means in the two populations and tested
if they were significantly different. For a large number of the characteristics this turned out to be the case
as is shown in Tables 2 and 3.
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Table 2: Mean characteristics of treatment and control group before matching.
Western Germany
Variable Treated Control %bias t p > |t|
Unemployment level 5.5 4.3 58.6 19.14 0.0
- long term 29.2 27.9 10.6 3.39 0.0
- long term, change -24.3 -26.3 5.0 1.54 0.1
Employed in the primary sector 1.0 1.7 -29.6 -8.16 0.0
- secondary sector 37.2 38.7 -8.7 -2.62 0.0
- tertiary sector 61.8 59.6 12.8 3.89 0.0
Commuters into municipality 62.6 66.5 -32.7 -10.13 0.0
Commuters out of municipality 60.2 73.3 -62.3 -19.44 0.0
Total tax revenues 674.5 598.5 22.6 6.99 0.0
Population density 866.6 490.8 45.7 14.48 0.0
Value added tax revenues 45.9 30.6 57.1 17.91 0.0
Commercial tax revenues 450.1 314.1 27.9 8.80 0.0
Income tax revenues 333.6 340.8 -8.9 -2.73 0.0
Distance to freeway 10.5 14.7 -38.4 -10.90 0.0
Distance to airport 47.1 58.6 -43.2 -12.76 0.0
Distance to fast trains 17.9 23.8 -38.4 -11.65 0.0
Distance to large urban center 20.9 28.1 -39.1 -12.17 0.0
Distance to medium urban center 5.1 10.4 -66.9 -19.20 0.0
Access to European neighbors 236.7 245.0 -31.0 -9.41 0.0
Newly constructed buildings 1.8 1.8 -5.0 -1.51 0.1
Share of single/two family housing 81.0 87.9 -54.8 -17.73 0.0
- multiple family housing 19.0 12.2 54.8 17.73 0.0
Small apartments 7.2 6.1 27.0 8.22 0.0
Large apartments 46.9 55.3 -55.6 -17.60 0.0
Size of postal code area (km2) 48.8 35.0 19.5 6.48 0.0
pct agriculture 47.9 54.0 -23.5 -7.26 0.0
pct urban area 19.4 13.3 31.0 9.29 0.0
pct water bodies 1.7 1.3 11.9 3.42 0.0
pct natural areas 21.3 28.3 -33.1 -9.87 0.0
pct industrial areas 6.7 1.7 56.5 22.17 0.0
pct land fills etc. 0.8 0.2 32.5 13.35 0.0
Note. Bias is defined as the difference in means between the treated and the non-treated subsample
divided by the square root of their average sample variances.
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Table 3: Mean characteristics of treatment and control group before matching.
Eastern Germany
Variable Treated Control %bias t p > |t|
Unemployment level 10.4 9.8 23.2 3.97 0.0
- long term 28.7 27.3 10.8 1.76 0.1
- long term, change -49.5 -50.8 4.8 0.79 0.4
Employed in the primary sector 5.0 3.3 29.2 4.91 0.0
- secondary sector 33.7 30.2 23.3 3.69 0.0
- tertiary sector 61.2 66.5 -31.1 -4.94 0.0
Commuters into municipality 61.4 54.2 43.4 6.55 0.0
Commuters out of municipality 65.5 56.8 35.0 5.34 0.0
Total tax revenues 381.2 386.0 -1.9 -0.31 0.8
Population density 345.7 1013.9 -61.1 -8.71 0.0
Value added tax revenues 32.0 33.6 -10.0 -1.68 0.1
Commercial tax revenues 223.7 219.3 1.6 0.27 0.8
Income tax revenues 150.4 167.4 -36.2 -5.53 0.0
Distance to freeway 16.6 16.0 4.5 -0.73 0.5
Distance to airport 74.3 63.0 24.9 4.01 0.0
Distance to fast trains 26.5 20.9 30.7 4.94 0.0
Distance to large urban center 34.6 25.8 38.5 6.20 0.0
Distance to medium urban center 9.6 9.0 12.3 2.01 0.0
Access to European neighbors 267.7 259.0 19.9 3.27 0.0
Newly constructed buildings 1.0 1.2 -8.1 -1.76 0.2
Share of single/two family housing 80.4 74.4 40.6 6.37 0.0
- multiple family housing 19.6 25.6 -40.6 -6.37 0.0
Small apartments 6.6 8.4 -46.8 -7.01 0.0
Large apartments 36.1 32.2 33.7 5.41 0.0
Size of postal code area (km2) 139.3 54.3 84.9 16.46 0.0
pct agriculture 60.8 42.7 66.3 10.45 0.0
pct urban area 9.3 25.4 -68.0 -9.84 0.0
pct water bodies 2.1 1.7 7.5 1.23 0.2
pct natural areas 22.7 23.5 -3.7 -0.58 0.6
pct industrial areas 3.2 3.5 -4.3 -0.70 0.5
pct land fills etc. 1.0 0.4 28.0 5.43 0.0
Note. Bias is defined as the difference in means between the treated and the non-treated subsample
divided by the square root of their average sample variances.
These tables also reveal the stark differences between former Eastern and Western Germany. Generally
speaking, the postal code areas in the treatment group in Western Germany have fewer commuters out of the
municipality, lower distance to medium sized urban centers, a higher population density also evidenced by a
larger share of apartment buildings than single family houses compared to the untreated postal code areas.
The treated areas seem to be less residential in nature: They tend to have higher VAT and higher commercial
tax revenues than the average postal code area without emissions and they have a higher percentage of
industrial area and a lower percentage of natural areas than the untreated postal code areas. In Eastern
Germany in contrast, the treated postal code areas tend to be of a more rural nature. A larger share of
employment is in the primary sector and a lower share in the tertiary sector. The treated postal code areas
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in Eastern Germany also have lower population density, more agricultural area and less urban area than the
postal code areas without emissions. They are further away form large urban centers and from main line train
stations. So where treatment in Western Germany is associated with the prevalence of industry, this seems
to be less the case in Eastern Germany. In both Eastern and Western Germany, treated postal codes tend
to have a higher unemployment level, lower income tax revenue, and the treated postal code areas tend to
be larger and have a larger share of landfills than the untreated postal code areas. Overall, this is consistent
with the treated postal code areas being less attractive than the postal code areas for which no emission
information had to be reported. These differences mirror the findings in Bui and Mayer (2003) when looking
at the characteristics of affected counties in Massachusetts. In fact, the authors find fairly similar systematic
differences between the counties subject to emissions registered in the TRI and those without emissions. For
instance, in their sample, the counties with non-zero emissions had a lower median household income and
lower health and welfare spending than their unaffected counterparts.
The idea underlying the matching approach is to find control units which are in fact comparable to the
treatment group in terms of relevant observable characteristics. We use propensity score matching which
aims to identify those postal code areas, which have equal likelihood of being treated, as far as this can
be predicted given observable variables. Our choice of characteristics upon which to base the matching
procedure was based on which characteristics could be expected to affect the evolution of residential housing
prices. Generally speaking, a probit or a logit is estimated with the treatment indicator as the dependent
variable. Then, observations are matched based on their propensity score, i.e. the likelihood of treatment.
Our propensity score matching uses the user written procedure psmatch2 for Stata. We employ nearest
neighbor matching to identify the relevant control group based on the observable characteristics of the postal
code areas. A logit model including the covariates was estimated for each region.10 Several of the covariates
were highly significant reflecting the different characteristics discussed above. We imposed common support
for the matched sample. This reduced the sample by 2 postal code areas in Western Germany. In Eastern
Germany, common support results in the loss of 13 postal code areas. A comparison of the treatment group
with the matched control group shows large improvements in terms of matching characteristics with sample
means on almost all characteristics insignificantly different from each other. A set of histograms comparing
the propensity scores odds ratio for the full and the matched samples can be found in the appendix for each
of our treatment definitions together with the estimates of the logit models (A.2 and A.3). We also include
figures displaying the evolution in average prices in the matched control and treatment group in the appendix
(A.4).
The control and the treatment group in each region are shown in Figure 3. It is clear that both the
treatment and the control postal code areas are scattered across each of the regions, i.e. although spatial
10To avoid multicollinearity we left the share of labor force employed in the primary sector, the share of single family housing,
and the share of urban land use out of the logit models used for matching.
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proximity is not directly a condition for matching, the outcome is not a control group spatially distinct from
the treatment group.
Figure 3: Treatment and control groups with matching
We carried out the differences in differences estimation using our matched samples but otherwise with
the same specification as in Table 1. The results of the estimation with matching are given in Table 4 where
we also report the previous results for convenience of the reader. The main coefficient for post treatment is
markedly reduced towards zero in comparison with the coefficient from the unmatched sample estimation for
both Eastern and Western Germany. This finding suggests that there is some bias in the original estimations
due to the inherent differences between the treatment and control postal code areas. Furthermore, when
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the standard errors are calculated with clustering at the postal code level, the treatment effect is no longer
significant at at any conventional level for either of the regions. Consequently, these results suggest that the
publication of the E-PRTR data had no significant impact on the evolution of house prices in the affected
areas once other observable differences are accounted for.
Table 4: Panel estimates, matched samples
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Full sample Matched sample Full sample Matched sample
Post*T 0.237 ** -0.046 -0.399 *** 0.170
(0.090) (0.131) (0.166) (0.240)
Constant 95.893 *** 96.376 *** 95.303 *** 94.966 ***
(0.029) (0.057) (0.060) (0.091)
Postal code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific Post Yes Yes Yes Yes
State specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.393 0.440 0.403 0.243
Observations 6799 1319 1413 568
Treated observations (T=1) 741 739 377 350
Note. Dependent variable is house price index; clustered standard errors in parantheses.
*/**/*** Significant at the 5%/1%/0,.1% level.
6 Robustness Checks
Several robustness checks were carried out to assess the impact of the definition of treatment. These ro-
bustness checks are intended to address concerns about the level of aggregation in our data and treatment
definition. First, we introduce a finer treatment definition based on the actual amounts of substances emitted.
Second, we introduce buffers to allow for an expanded treatment effect on postal code areas within 500 m
of a facility. Third, as our housing price index concerns residential property, we estimate a model where we
limit the treatment definition to only those postal code areas where urban area or urban green space was
within 500 m of an emitter facility. Summarizing, the robustness checks provide the same picture as the main
results discussed above: the publication of emissions information seems to have had little impact on average
prices in a postal code area. The robustness checks are described in more detail below.11
11It is well-known that matching techniques can be sensitive to the specification of the logit/probit model. We tested
alternative specifications without qualitatively changing the results.
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6.1 Quartiles of emissions
The binary definition of treatment status underlying the preceding analyses may be too crude as we do not
account for the amount of substances emitted. Sanders (2013) looks at quartiles of emitted quantities to
address the concern that the quantity emitted may be important. We follow this approach and aggregate the
emissions of different substances to a measure of total weighted emissions within a postal code area where
the weights assigned to different substances are intended to account for the potential severity of the effects of
these individual emissions. For severity we use the reporting thresholds from the E-PRTR as a proxy. These
thresholds are lower for more potent substances such as benzene or dioxin than for less potent substances such
as nitrogen oxides. The thresholds are publicly available and as no toxicity measure is contained within the
E-PRTR we believe that this measure captures well the level of information easily available to households.12
For this treatment definition we consider a model that separates the group of treated postal codes into 4
quartiles according to their total weighted emissions, calculated as the sum all emissions within the postal
code area weighted by their corresponding reporting thresholds. The lowest quartile represents the least
affected 25% of postal codes, while the fourth quartile represents the most heavily polluted areas as identified
by the 2009 E-PRTR dataset. The regression model takes the form:
Yits = α
0 + α1sPostitStates +
4∑
j=1
[
α2jTj + α
3
jPostitTj
]
+ α4i + α
5
tsStates + eits
The coefficients of interest are now the α3j as they correspond to the interaction of the shift dummy
variable (Post) and the treatment dummy (Tj) with respect to each of the j = 1, 2, 3, 4 quartiles. The results
are shown in Table 5. For Western Germany in the full sample without matching again a positive treatment
effect is found. However, the effect is largest for the higher quartiles of emissions and insignificant for low
emissions. Once matching is employed, we find no significant impact of treatment for any of the quartiles.
For Eastern Germany, the effect of emissions information is negative and significant for the second quartile.
With matched samples however, no significant effect is found at all for the information release. Summarizing,
the results from the main specifications are confirmed in this robustness check. We also carried out analysis
distinguishing between emissions to air and water respectively. With only 6 emissions to soil the data is
too thin to analyze this medium separately. Again, no significant effect could be found in either Western of
Eastern Germany after matching was carried out.13
12The reporting thresholds are an imperfect proxy for toxicity. They are not directly intended to capture toxicity but rather
to ensure that as many emissions are covered by the register as possible. Still, when looking across the table of thresholds
and the substances, there is a clear pattern that lower thresholds are associated with substances generally perceived as being
dangerous.
13A table of these results is available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5: Quartiles of emissions
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Full sample Matched sample Full sample Matched sample
Post*TQ1 0.003 -0.355 -0.438 0.160
(0.189) (0.213) (0.248) (0.297)
Post*TQ2 0.038 -0.239 -0.537 * 0.0430
(0.201) (0.222) (0.246) (0.298)
Post*TQ3 0.442 ** 0.133 -0.299 0.203
(0.157) (0.184) (0.305) (0.370)
Post*TQ4 0.350 * 0.130 -0.138 0.450
(0.140) (0.166) (0.405) (0.449)
Constant 95.893 *** 96.376 *** 95.303 *** 94.966 ***
(0.029) (0.057) (0.059) (0.091)
Postal code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific Post Yes Yes Yes Yes
State specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.393 0.442 0.424 0.244
Observations 6799 1319 1413 568
Treated observations (T=1) 741 739 377 350
Note. Dependent variable is house price index; clustered standard errors in parantheses.
*/**/*** Significant at the 5%/1%/0.1% level.
6.2 Buffers
E-PRTR requires the geographical coordinates to be reported with a maximum of +/- 500 m distance from
the actual location of the facility and some emitters will be located on the border of the postal code area.
We therefore construct an alternative treatment measure that defines a postal code area as treated if some
part of its land is within a 500 m buffer distance from an emitter. Of course, the number of affected postal
code areas in our study increases with the buffer distance around the point sources. With a 500 m buffer
around point sources, the number of affected postal code areas rises to 1,585.14 We would not expect there to
be systematic error in the reported location of facilities such that postal code areas in the narrow treatment
definition are wrongly identified as treated. That would require facilities to be generally located on the border
of postal code areas and wrongly assigned. By broadening our treatment definition we allow for cross border
effects but also get a noisier sample. We expect broadening of the treatment definition to weaken the results
rather than change the conclusions. Looking at the results in Table 6, the new treatment definition does not
14
This includes emissions from 13 additional facilities located in neighbouring countries but close enough to the border to affect
German postal code areas.
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Table 6: Treatment based on buffers
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Full sample Matched sample Full sample Matched sample
Post*T 0.408 *** 0.206 -0.286 0.112
(0.0801) (0.116) (0.154) (0.211)
Constant 95.893 ** 96.365 *** 95.303 *** 94.975 ***
(0.029) (0.049) (0.059) (0.080)
Postal code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific Post Yes Yes Yes Yes
State specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.388 0.439 0.424 0.319
Observations 6799 1920 1413 683
Treated observations (T=1) 1127 1124 458 428
Note. Dependent variable is house price index; clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*/**/*** Significant at the 5%/1%/0.1% level.
change the estimates substantially. Overall, previous results are confirmed showing that they did not suffer
from a bias due to emitters located close to the border of the postal code areas.
6.3 Urban areas only
In a last robustness check, the sample is reduced to those areas that contain urban parts, i.e. areas labelled
as “Urban feature or urban green space” according to the Corine Land Cover project. Here, postal code
areas are defined as treated if there is an emission reported within 500 meters of the urban area. As a result,
the number of treated areas drops by about 50 % as compared with the original treatment definition using
the 500 m buffer. Compared to the definition without a buffer the reduction is by about 40 %. Since we are
restricting attention to postal code areas where non-industrial urban areas are in close proximity to emissions,
this treatment definition should be the most likely to show an effect of treatment of all the specifications that
we looked at. In total there are 826 affected postal code areas with the urban treatment definition. Their
spatial distribution is seen in figure 4.
Estimations are carried out for the full sample divided into Eastern Germany and Western Germany.
Additionally, matching is carried out using propensity scores based on the extensive data collected charac-
terizing a postal code area. As in the baseline estimation, matching yields a control group in Western and
Eastern Germany which is largely similar to the treatment group in terms of observable characteristics (see
appendix A.5 for a comparison of charactersitics pre- and post-matching). Two matching definitions are
used: Match A and Match B. B is like A, but excludes all postal code areas from the control group, which
20
Figure 4: Map of treated areas and controls
had emissions in 2009 that were not near urban areas. The results are seen in table 7. For the matched
samples, no significant effect could be found in either Western Germany or Eastern Germany.
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Table 7: Results: Differences-in-differences estimation
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Full Matched A Matched B Full Matched A Matched B
Post*T 0.319 ** -0.0635 -0.110 -0.396 * -0.153 -0.271
(0.099) (0.154) (0.165) (0.185) (0.257) (0.269)
Constant 95.89 *** 96.71 *** 96.69 *** 95.30 *** 94.98 *** 95.19 ***
(0.029) (0.064) (0.066) (0.059) (0.104) (0.110)
Postal code FE X X X X X X
State-specific Post X X X X X X
State-specific trends X X X X X X
Number of postal code areas 6799 1071 995 1413 390 348
Treated 603 603 603 223 215 215
R2 0.387 0.463 0.466 0.424 0.327 0.357
Note. Dependent variable is house price index; clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Matched A: Propensity score matching of treated and untreated postal code areas within region
Matched B: As A but excluding areas with emissions outside urban areas
*/**/*** Significant at the 5%/1%/0.1% level.
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7 Concluding discussion
The quasi-experimental literature aims to get as close to a lab experiment as possible, however, the events
under study do take place in the real world and require that care be taken in ensuring that the control and
treatment units are comparable. We collected a sizable data set characterizing the areas under study in
order to facilitate identification of a suitable control group. Postal code areas with and without emissions
are found to be quite different on average. Moreover, the characteristics of postal code areas with emissions
differ vastly between the former Eastern and Western Germany. Our analysis hints at the importance of also
considering the market in which capitalization takes place as a way to control for unobservable differences in
addition to observable characteristics.
A possible threat to recovering an effect is aggregation bias. We are working with housing data at the
postal code level as access to nation-wide micro data for the German housing market is generally quite
limited. This data set may just be too crude to capture effects at the very local scale. Oberholzer-Gee and
Mitsunari (2006) find a robust effect on house prices only within half a mile of the polluting facility with
their micro-data on individual transactions. Currie et al. (2013), using a very detailed dataset of housing
transactions and openings and closings of polluting facilities, identify an effect on house prices within 1 mile
of the facility with the largest impact found within half a mile of the facility. Our house price index concerns
the price of the average house in a postal code area. Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2013) emphasize that
undesirable neighbors are more likely to be present for homes at the lower quantiles of the price distribution.
As such it may be that the impact on the mean is not significant, but an effect on lower percentiles of the
distribution can not be ruled out based on our analysis.
Our findings do not necessarily imply that households do not care about pollution or that the release of
E-PRTR information has been ignored by the public. There can be several reasons why no adjustment of
risk perception takes place upon the publication of emissions information. A possible explanation is, that
households already have a good idea about the amount of pollution in the area in which they live before
buying their homes and therefore pollution from emitters in the area is already capitalized in the prevailing
housing prices. In this case, the data available on the E-PRTR website might not have been real news
for households living in areas with high pollution levels. Alternatively, it may be that households did not
understand the information provided in the E-PRTR since they were possibly not acquainted with the toxicity
of the individual pollutants. Early studies of the TRI also failed to find an effect at the community level (Bui
and Mayer, 2003). More recent studies do find effects of TRI publications, but there may also be heightened
awareness of these issues now than in the early days of the TRI and the published information is spread also
by environmental NGOs. This is evidenced by the existence of e.g. top 10-lists of worst polluters in the US.
Recent research by Schlenker and Scorse (2012) suggests that companies react to their placement on such
scorecards perhaps in anticipation of community pressure.
23
“Regulation by information” may be a useful policy tool but the prerequisite is that people are aware
and capable of understanding the information provided to them. In the US state of California disclosure
laws make realtors liable in cases where homeowners were not informed prior to purchase about exposure
of their property to undesirable substances/neighbors. In Germany no such policy is in place and there is
no incentive for a realtor or owner to inform potential buyers or tenants of the less attractive aspects of a
property.
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A Appendix
A.1 Logit estimations for propensity score matching
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Table 8: Logit estimates for matching, part I
Treatment status Western Germany Eastern Germany
no buffer 500 m buffer No buffer 500 m buffer
Unemployment 0.0676 0.0899 * 0.0026 0.0079
(0.0466) (0.0398) (0.0458) (0.0435)
Long term unempl. -0.0108 -0.0129 * 0.0046 0.0050
(0.0065) (0.0055) (0.0138) (0.0132)
Change in l.t. unempl. 0.0004 -0.0000 0.0045 0.0002
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0073) (0.0070)
New construction 0.0506 0.0486 -0.0346 0.0084
(0.0354) (0.0294) (0.0655) (0.0505)
Secondary sector employment 0.0277 0.0255 0.0067 -0.0053
(0.0246) (0.0204) (0.0176) (0.0168)
Tertiary sector employment 0.0010 0.0022 -0.0089 -0.0167
(0.0251) (0.0208) (0.0183) (0.0174)
Commuters into area 0.0047 0.0075 0.0152 0.0214
(0.0062) (0.0053) (0.0122) (0.0115)
Commuters out of area -0.0124 * -0.0059 -0.0255 * -0.0293 **
(0.0055) (0.0047) (0.0121) (0.0114)
Total tax revenues 0.0013 * 0.0017 * -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Population density 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006 ** -0.0004 *
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Value-added tax revenues 0.0063 0.0032 -0.0102 -0.0135
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0084) (0.0081)
Commercial tax revenues -0.0008 -0.0010 * 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Income tax revenues -0.0056 *** -0.0044 *** 0.0055 0.0057
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0031)
Distance to highway -0.0048 -0.0076 -0.0117 -0.0071
(0.0056) (0.0048) (0.0076) (0.0072)
Distance to airport -0.0039 -0.0057 * 0.0008 -0.0025
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0025)
Distance to train station -0.0017 -0.0028 0.0022 0.00063
(0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0056) (0.0053)
ll -1913.8 -2516.7 -611.4 -708.5
Observations 6788 6788 1370 1370
Note. Dependent variable is house price index; clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*/**/*** Significant at the 5%/1%/0.1% level.
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Table 9: Logit estimates, part II
Treatment status Western Germany Eastern Germany
No buffer 500 m buffer No buffer 500 m buffer
Distance to large urban center -0.0047 -0.0081 * 0.0012 -0.0010
(0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0053) (0.0050)
Distance to medium urban cent. -0.0527 *** -0.0593 *** -0.0274 * -0.0346 **
(0.0090) (0.0079) (0.0125) (0.0120)
Distance to European center -0.0047 -0.0017 0.0011 0.0041
(0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Apartment buildings -0.0057 0.0158 0.0151 -0.0011
(0.0114) (0.0096) (0.0168) (0.0157)
Small apt. -0.0204 -0.0158 -0.0163 -0.0082
(0.0223) (0.0187) (0.0443) (0.0402)
Large apt. -0.0179 -0.0074 0.0056 -0.0018
(0.0111) (0.0094) (0.0185) (0.0175)
Size of postal code area 1.27e-08 *** 1.16e-08 *** 1.05e-08 *** 1.05e-08 ***
(1.31e-09) (1.18e-09) (1.18e-09) (1.18e-09)
Land use agriculture 0.0169 *** 0.0090 ** 0.0218 *** 0.0139 **
(0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0065) (0.0052)
Land use water 0.0571 *** 0.0454 *** 0.0278 0.0076
(0.0109) (0.0096) (0.0171) (0.0158)
Land use natural area 0.0061 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0010
(0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0073) (0.0058)
Land use industry 0.0589 *** 0.0511 *** 0.0592 *** 0.0409 ***
(0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0124) (0.0099)
Land use landfills 0.151 *** 0.196 *** 0.170 *** 0.166 ***
(0.0228) (0.0254) (0.0376) (0.0383)
Constant -0.618 -1.709 -2.887 -1.532
(2.903) (2.400) (2.612) (2.467)
ll -1913.8 -2516.7 -611.4 -708.5
Observations 6788 6788 1370 1370
Note. Dependent variable is house price index; clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*/**/*** Significant at the 5%/1%/0.1% level.
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A.2 Distribution of propensity scores
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
−15 −10 −5 0 5 −15 −10 −5 0 5
0 1
D
en
si
ty
psmatch2: Propensity Score
Graphs by treat_T0
Histogram of propensity scores − full
Full sample
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
−4 −2 0 2 −4 −2 0 2
0 1
D
en
si
ty
psmatch2: Propensity Score
Graphs by treat_T0
Histogram of propensity scores − data2
Matched sample
Figure 5: Propensity scores, Western Germany, no buffer
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Figure 6: Propensity scores, Western Germany, 500 m buffer
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Figure 7: Propensity scores, Eastern Germany, no buffer
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Figure 8: Propensity scores, Eastern Germany, 500 m buffer
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A.3 Histograms urban area only
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Figure 9: Histograms of propensity scores, urban area, Western Germany
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Figure 10: Histograms of propensity scores, urban area, Eastern Germany
34
A.4 House price index for matched control and treatment group
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Figure 11: Evolution in mean price index, control and treatment groups
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A.5 Characteristics post matching, treatment and control group
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Table 10: Treatment and control group before and after matching, Eastern Germany
Unmatched Mean % reduction t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias —bias— t p¿—t—
Unemployment Unmatched 10.436 9.822 23.2 3.97 0
Matched 10.388 10.17 8.2 64.5 1.01 0.311
Unempl. longt. Unmatched 28.701 27.262 10.8 1.76 0.079
Matched 29.008 28.492 3.9 64.1 0.51 0.608
∆Unempl. longt. Unmatched -49.518 -50.771 4.8 0.79 0.431
Matched -49.134 -49.827 2.7 44.7 0.36 0.722
Construction Unmatched 1.055 1.188 -8.1 -1.21 0.225
Matched 1.049 1.141 -5.7 30.3 -1.08 0.282
Empl. secondary Unmatched 33.746 30.154 23.3 3.69 0
Matched 33.798 34.536 -4.8 79.5 -0.64 0.52
Empl. tertiary Unmatched 61.207 66.49 -31.1 -4.94 0
Matched 61.201 60.826 2.2 92.9 0.3 0.762
Commute in Unmatched 61.367 54.199 43.4 6.55 0
Matched 61.66 62.708 -6.3 85.4 -1.02 0.306
Commute out Unmatched 65.479 56.832 35 5.34 0
Matched 65.712 66.634 -3.7 89.3 -0.58 0.561
Tax rev. Unmatched 381.24 386.05 -1.9 -0.31 0.759
Matched 383.4 424.32 -15.9 -750.8 -1.12 0.264
Pop. density Unmatched 345.65 1013.9 -61.1 -8.71 0
Matched 355.5 321.35 3.1 94.9 0.75 0.454
VAT rev. Unmatched 32.039 33.641 -10 -1.68 0.094
Matched 32.135 32.556 -2.6 73.8 -0.34 0.737
Corp. tax rev. Unmatched 223.72 219.31 1.6 0.27 0.789
Matched 226.94 258.59 -11.6 -617.6 -0.89 0.373
Income tax rev. Unmatched 150.4 167.4 -36.2 -5.53 0
Matched 150.7 150.81 -0.2 99.3 -0.04 0.969
Dist. Autobahn Unmatched 16.594 16.017 4.5 0.73 0.466
Matched 16.458 14.209 17.4 -289.8 2.49 0.013
Dist. airport Unmatched 74.282 62.992 24.9 4.01 0
Matched 74.257 72.842 3.1 87.5 0.41 0.679
Dist. train st. Unmatched 26.531 20.906 30.7 4.94 0
Matched 26.167 24.805 7.4 75.8 1.03 0.303
Dist. large urb. Unmatched 34.645 25.833 38.5 6.2 0
Matched 34.067 31.843 9.7 74.8 1.39 0.166
Dist. medium urb. Unmatched 9.687 8.580 12.3 2.01 0.045
Matched 9.868 9.390 5.3 56.8 0.71 0.476
Dist. Europe Unmatched 267.73 258.96 19.9 3.27 0.001
Matched 268.5 265.31 7.2 63.6 0.98 0.328
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Table 10: Treatment and control group before and after matching, Eastern Germany (cont.)
Unmatched Mean % reduction t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias —bias— t p¿—t—
Share multiple family home Unmatched 19.648 25.563 -40.6 -6.37 0
Matched 19.725 19.445 1.9 95.3 0.28 0.776
Small apt. Unmatched 6.633 8.403 -46.8 -7.01 0
Matched 6.637 6.596 1.1 97.6 0.18 0.858
Large apt. Unmatched 36.079 32.247 33.7 5.41 0
Matched 36.105 36.213 -0.9 97.2 -0.13 0.898
Postal code size Unmatched 1.40E+08 5.40E+07 84 0.5 16.2 0
Matched 1.20E+08 1.20E+08 4.7 94.5 0.64 0.52
pct agri Unmatched 60.322 42.302 66 10.19 0
Matched 60.235 60.458 -0.8 98.8 -0.13 0.9
pct water Unmatched 2.103 1.815 6.5 1.05 0.295
Matched 2.130 2.137 -0.2 97.4 -0.02 0.982
pct nat Unmatched 22.893 23.187 -1.4 -0.22 0.828
Matched 22.524 22.789 -1.3 9.6 -0.19 0.85
pct ind Unmatched 3.296 3.601 -4.1 -0.64 0.521
Matched 3.401 3.429 -0.4 90.8 -0.05 0.961
pct dep Unmatched 0.954 0.363 27.3 5.23 0
Matched 0.988 1.009 -1 96.4 -0.1 0.918
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Table 11: Treatment and control group before and after matching, Western Germany
Unmatched Mean % reduction t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias —bias— t p¿—t—
Unemployment Unmatched 5.548 4.374 57.8 15.66 0
Matched 5.548 5.530 0.9 98.4 0.16 0.871
Unempl. longt. Unmatched 29.175 27.982 9.2 2.49 0.013
Matched 29.175 29.56 -3 67.8 -0.54 0.589
∆Unempl. longt. Unmatched -24.406 -26.128 4.3 1.12 0.263
Matched -24.406 -23.486 -2.3 46.6 -0.44 0.658
Construction Unmatched 1.728 1.827 -6.7 -1.72 0.086
Matched 1.728 1.774 -3.2 53 -0.66 0.511
Empl. secondary Unmatched 38.336 38.432 -0.6 -0.15 0.882
Matched 38.336 38.892 -3.4 -476.6 -0.64 0.521
Empl. tertiary Unmatched 60.622 59.916 4.3 1.09 0.277
Matched 60.622 60.11 3.1 27.5 0.58 0.559
Commute in Unmatched 61.863 66.291 -37.6 -9.67 0
Matched 61.863 61.383 4.1 89.2 0.77 0.444
Commute out Unmatched 59.227 72.557 -64 -16.41 0
Matched 59.227 58.797 2.1 96.8 0.39 0.697
Tax rev. Unmatched 668.48 604.06 19 4.95 0
Matched 668.48 661.35 2.1 88.9 0.28 0.782
Pop. density Unmatched 822.78 520.09 36.8 9.69 0
Matched 822.78 791.69 3.8 89.7 0.67 0.503
VAT rev. Unmatched 46.508 31.524 55.8 14.57 0
Matched 46.508 45.55 3.6 93.6 0.63 0.531
Corp. tax rev. Unmatched 451.21 322.66 25.9 6.96 0
Matched 451.21 443.29 1.6 93.8 0.23 0.816
Income tax rev. Unmatched 325.38 341.33 -20 -5.09 0
Matched 325.38 322.85 3.2 84.1 0.63 0.528
Dist. Autobahn Unmatched 11.075 14.347 -28.8 -6.99 0
Matched 11.075 11.897 -7.2 74.9 -1.55 0.121
Dist. airport Unmatched 48.457 57.707 -34.3 -8.49 0
Matched 48.457 49.835 -5.1 85.1 -1.02 0.308
Dist. train st. Unmatched 18.985 23.299 -27.6 -7.01 0
Matched 18.985 19.984 -6.4 76.8 -1.2 0.231
Dist. large urb. Unmatched 22.622 27.438 -25.4 -6.72 0
Matched 22.622 23.36 -3.9 84.7 -0.74 0.46
Dist. medium urb. Unmatched 5.217 10.04 -60 -14.49 0
Matched 5.217 5.145 0.9 98.5 0.2 0.845
Dist. Europe Unmatched 238.62 244.18 -20.7 -5.3 0
Matched 238.62 239.89 -4.7 77.2 -0.91 0.361
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Table 11: Treatment and control group before and after matching, Western Germany (cont.)
Unmatched Mean % reduction t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias —bias— t p¿—t—
Share multiple family home Unmatched 18.294 12.683 44.7 11.96 0
Matched 18.294 17.85 3.5 92.1 0.63 0.53
Small apt. Unmatched 6.992 6.161 20.6 5.2 0
Matched 6.992 6.963 0.7 96.5 0.14 0.891
Large apt. Unmatched 47.549 54.707 -47.3 -12.45 0
Matched 47.549 48.267 -4.7 90 -0.87 0.382
Postal code size Unmatched 4.90E+07 3.50E+07 35 10.18 0
Matched 4.90E+07 5.20E+07 -9.6 72.6 -1.47 0.141
pct agri Unmatched 49.477 53.452 -15.4 -3.94 0
Matched 49.477 50.089 -2.4 84.6 -0.44 0.657
pct water Unmatched 1.943 1.259 17.2 4.22 0
Matched 1.943 1.757 4.7 72.8 0.82 0.415
pct nat Unmatched 21.381 27.809 -30.7 -7.58 0
Matched 21.381 21.971 -2.8 90.8 -0.56 0.577
pct ind Unmatched 7.325 1.964 56.8 19.74 0
Matched 7.325 6.486 8.9 84.3 1.27 0.206
pct dep Unmatched 0.852 0.256 35.6 10.95 0
Matched 0.852 0.894 -2.5 93 -0.29 0.772
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Table 12: Urban: Treatment and control group before and after matching (A), Eastern Germany
Unmatched Mean % reduction t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias —bias— t p¿—t—
Unemployment Unmatched 10.604 9.870 28.7 3.92 0
Matched 10.604 10.631 -1.1 96.3 -0.11 0.915
Unempl. longt. Unmatched 28.353 27.511 6.3 0.85 0.396
Matched 28.353 28.259 0.7 88.7 0.07 0.945
∆Unempl. longt. Unmatched -49.846 -50.55 2.8 0.36 0.715
Matched -49.846 -50.123 1.1 60.6 0.11 0.914
Construction Unmatched 0.835 1.212 -26.3 -2.84 0.005
Matched 0.835 0.782 3.7 85.8 0.84 0.403
Empl. secondary Unmatched 32.133 30.914 7.8 1.03 0.304
Matched 32.133 33.37 -7.9 -1.5 -0.84 0.4
Empl. tertiary Unmatched 63.99 65.295 -7.5 -1 0.319
Matched 63.99 62.306 9.7 -29 1.01 0.312
Commute in Unmatched 56.375 56.047 1.9 0.24 0.808
Matched 56.375 57.642 -7.3 -286 -0.83 0.409
Commute out Unmatched 57.672 59.394 -6.6 -0.87 0.386
Matched 57.672 59.868 -8.5 -27.6 -0.94 0.345
Tax rev. Unmatched 382.59 385.18 -1.2 -0.14 0.891
Matched 382.59 374.1 3.9 -227.4 0.57 0.568
Pop. density Unmatched 702.45 861.88 -13.1 -1.67 0.095
Matched 702.45 583.22 9.8 25.2 1.18 0.24
VAT rev. Unmatched 34.804 32.921 11.8 1.62 0.105
Matched 34.804 34.469 2.1 82.2 0.22 0.828
Corp. tax rev. Unmatched 230.11 218.68 4.9 0.57 0.568
Matched 230.11 226.45 1.6 68 0.19 0.853
Income tax rev. Unmatched 156.41 164.11 -16.1 -2.05 0.041
Matched 156.41 151.48 10.3 36 1.21 0.227
Dist. Autobahn Unmatched 15.424 16.309 -7 -0.92 0.356
Matched 15.424 16.123 -5.5 21 -0.54 0.587
Dist. airport Unmatched 67.318 65.735 3.5 0.46 0.645
Matched 67.318 65.573 3.8 -10.2 0.44 0.657
Dist. train st. Unmatched 22.716 22.337 2 0.27 0.786
Matched 22.716 24.315 -8.5 -322.1 -0.88 0.379
Dist. large urb. Unmatched 29.347 27.948 5.9 0.8 0.424
Matched 29.347 31.119 -7.5 -26.7 -0.75 0.452
Dist. medium urb. Unmatched 7.638 9.103 -16.6 -2.19 0.029
Matched 7.638 8.212 -6.5 60.8 -0.68 0.496
Dist. Europe Unmatched 263.63 260.85 6.1 0.85 0.395
Matched 263.63 266.69 -6.7 -9.9 -0.74 0.462
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Table 12: Urban: Treatment and control group before and after matching (A), Eastern Germany (cont.)
Unmatched Mean % reduction t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias —bias— t p¿—t—
Share multiple family home Unmatched 24.656 23.873 5.1 0.69 0.493
Matched 24.656 23.415 8.1 -58.4 0.88 0.379
Small apt. Unmatched 7.639 7.989 -8.8 -1.12 0.262
Matched 7.639 7.281 9 -2.6 1.03 0.303
Large apt. Unmatched 32.865 33.336 -4.1 -0.54 0.588
Matched 32.865 33.542 -5.9 -43.8 -0.62 0.539
Postal code size Unmatched 1.10E+08 7.00E+07 42 0.4 6.35 0
Matched 1.10E+08 1.10E+08 4.3 89.9 0.36 0.721
pct agri Unmatched 54.254 45.741 28.6 3.85 0
Matched 54.254 57.807 -11.9 58.3 -1.29 0.196
pct water Unmatched 1.66 1.935 -6.3 -0.82 0.41
Matched 1.66 1.687 -0.6 90.3 -0.07 0.945
pct nat Unmatched 18.53 23.962 -26.6 -3.32 0.001
Matched 18.53 18.888 -1.7 93.4 -0.2 0.839
pct ind Unmatched 4.831 3.277 18.8 2.7 0.007
Matched 4.831 4.006 10 46.9 0.93 0.354
pct dep Unmatched 0.764 0.475 13.9 2.09 0.037
Matched 0.764 1.068 -14.7 -5.1 -1.13 0.257
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Table 13: Urban: Treatment and control group before and after matching (A), Western Germany
Unmatched Mean % reduction t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias —bias— t p¿—t—
Unemployment Unmatched 6.093 4.346 87 21.62 0
Matched 6.093 6.051 2.1 97.6 0.34 0.731
Unempl. longt. Unmatched 31.961 27.737 33.4 8.1 0
Matched 31.961 31.905 0.4 98.7 0.07 0.941
∆Unempl. longt. Unmatched -17.896 -26.728 22.5 5.25 0
Matched -17.896 -18.372 1.2 94.6 0.22 0.827
Construction Unmatched 1.617 1.836 -16.6 -3.44 0.001
Matched 1.617 1.638 -1.6 90.3 -0.36 0.722
Empl. secondary Unmatched 34.984 38.755 -23.1 -5.32 0
Matched 34.984 34.702 1.7 92.5 0.3 0.763
Empl. tertiary Unmatched 64.436 59.561 29.7 6.87 0
Matched 64.436 64.723 -1.7 94.1 -0.3 0.762
Commute in Unmatched 60.001 66.374 -54.4 -12.78 0
Matched 60.001 60.098 -0.8 98.5 -0.14 0.885
Commute out Unmatched 53.129 72.854 -96.1 -22.54 0
Matched 53.129 52.395 3.6 96.3 0.61 0.542
Tax rev. Unmatched 682.45 604.12 26.1 5.5 0
Matched 682.45 676.61 1.9 92.5 0.38 0.704
Pop. density Unmatched 1117.7 498.05 72.2 18.44 0
Matched 1117.7 1091.2 3.1 95.7 0.5 0.62
VAT rev. Unmatched 52.248 31.298 78.7 18.8 0
Matched 52.248 51.51 2.8 96.5 0.46 0.646
Corp. tax rev. Unmatched 474.37 323.25 34.4 7.47 0
Matched 474.37 468.35 1.4 96 0.26 0.793
Income tax rev. Unmatched 333.8 340.16 -8.3 -1.85 0.064
Matched 333.8 331.7 2.7 67 0.52 0.605
Dist. Autobahn Unmatched 9.887 14.39 -40.7 -8.81 0
Matched 9.887 9.474 3.7 90.8 0.78 0.433
Dist. airport Unmatched 43.852 57.951 -52.9 -11.88 0
Matched 43.852 45.043 -4.5 91.5 -0.79 0.43
Dist. train st. Unmatched 14.825 23.606 -57.1 -13.16 0
Matched 14.825 14.561 1.7 97 0.31 0.759
Dist. large urb. Unmatched 17.361 27.844 -57.1 -13.5 0
Matched 17.361 16.927 2.4 95.9 0.41 0.681
Dist. medium urb. Unmatched 2.967 10.152 -98 -19.99 0
Matched 2.967 2.612 4.8 95.1 1.15 0.252
Dist. Europe Unmatched 233.51 244.56 -41.6 -9.66 0
Matched 233.51 235.02 -5.7 86.3 -1 0.318
44
Table 13: Urban: Treatment and control group before and after matching (A), Western Germany (cont.)
Unmatched Mean % reduction t-test
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias —bias— t p¿—t—
Share multiple family home Unmatched 23.388 12.311 87.2 22.1 0
Matched 23.388 23.487 -0.8 99.1 -0.13 0.9
Small apt. Unmatched 8.105 6.071 49.5 11.71 0
Matched 8.105 8.287 -4.4 91 -0.77 0.444
Large apt. Unmatched 41.457 55.142 -94.8 -22.28 0
Matched 41.457 41.087 2.6 97.3 0.44 0.657
Postal code size Unmatched 3.60E+07 3.60E+07 -0.4 -0.11 0.915
Matched 3.60E+07 3.80E+07 -4 -808 -0.58 0.563
pct agri Unmatched 40.287 54.26 -54 -12.78 0
Matched 40.287 40.747 -1.8 96.7 -0.3 0.766
pct water Unmatched 1.632 1.304 8.8 1.85 0.065
Matched 1.632 1.627 0.1 98.5 0.02 0.982
pct nat Unmatched 20.441 27.755 -34.5 -7.88 0
Matched 20.441 19.959 2.3 93.4 0.4 0.691
pct ind Unmatched 8.422 1.983 68.6 21.7 0
Matched 8.422 7.366 11.2 83.6 1.51 0.132
pct dep Unmatched 0.811 0.273 30.1 9 0
Matched 0.811 0.542 15 50.1 2.18 0.029
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